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Around the world, public service broadcasting [PSB] is under pressure. Challenges to 
its rationale, audience, income and legitimacy are manifold today, especially the 
globalising communications market, technological convergence and diversification of 
content delivery, increasing competition for advertising and other revenues, and a 
political climate that prioritises economic over social and cultural policy (Raboy 
2008). Is PSB the anachronistic legacy of a dying welfare liberal regime, or does it 
advocate crucial democratic and cultural values that continue to have relevance? 
Should public funds support existing providers, or be extended to encompass a 
plurality of content providers or, merely, be concentrated on cases of market failure 
(Gibbons 2009)? Difficult questions are being asked in different countries in different 
ways, depending on the size of the existing media system, the strength of its public 
service broadcasters and the level of dependency between broadcasters and the state 
(Iosofidis 2010).  
 
In the UK, public service broadcasters have sustained a substantial if declining share 
of the market, certainly remaining strong by comparison with public broadcasting in 
other countries. The BBC lost its monopoly position in the 1950s, followed by a 
duopoly comprised of the BBC and ITV. The system was later evolved into a mixed 
market that includes commercial PSB providers, especially Channel Four and Five. 
Despite so much change, the BBC remains at the core of the UK media system, 
valued highly by the public and across the political spectrum (Collins and Murroni 
1996). But even here in ‘the heartland’ of its initiation and development, the 
challenges are growing. To have a sustainable future, it is vital for PSB to earnestly 
pursue considerable innovation in organisation, funding and platforms.  
 
This chapter focuses less on practical adjustments and privileges the more 
fundamental importance of the rationale that provides legitimacy for PSB in the first 
place. Our study investigates how the traditionally strong BBC has undergone critical 
scrutiny and public contestation over the past decade, orchestrated by the UK’s 
largely market-focused regulator, the Office of Communications [Ofcom]. Bolstered 
by its self-avowed ‘philosophy’ of asking the big questions as well as by its 
comfortable centrality to the New Labour project of regulatory reform, Ofcom began 
by asking whether incremental adaptation can really preserve what is of value in 
public service media [PSM] or whether, instead, radical changes are needed. It raised 
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the possibility that at some point in the foreseeable future PSB as a publicly funded 
venture would and should even give way to a fully commercial media system. 
Although Ofcom came to moderate its initial views for a range of reasons elucidated 
below, we argue that policy debates during the first decade of this century have 
diminished the autonomy and self-determination of PSB in the UK – as has arguably 
been the case elsewhere. 
 
Of course, the BBC has adapted, in many says successfully. The company has 
broadened programme forms, platforms and content – becoming in some ways more 
populist in orientation. Some see this as evidence of the BBC losing its way (Barnett 
and Seaton 2010; Born 2004). The historic legacy of left wing critics have more 
recently been joined by those who celebrate the innovative potential of liberalised 
markets and new technologies. Both sides, in a sense all sides, now accusing the BBC 
of being a conservative force in British Broadcasting, albeit with different inflections. 
For the former the BBC is accused of defining the public interest from an elite 
perspective, while for the latter it is construed as a brake on innovation. The two 
camps agree in criticism that the BBC is too powerful in the British market, relatively 
unaccountable to its public, and too close to government (Jakubovitz 2007; 
Livingstone and Lunt 1994). Although the principle of financial independence, either 
through the license fee or favourable prices for commercial licenses in return for 
public service content, as well as freedom from political interference, is still broadly 
supported, governments no longer accord the BBC a special place in the nation’s 
infrastructure. Government instead insists that the enterprise must demonstrable value 
for money with measurable public value in the field of media and communications, 
the same as in any other field of publicly funded activity. In this contested and fast-
changing context, our purpose is to ask how supporters of PSB, including the BBC 
and other PSB companies in-house, might regain the initiative? We begin by setting 
our UK case study in a wider context. 
 
 
Media policy and regulation in Europe 
 
“New regulatory authorities are being created, with new structures, degrees of 
independence and areas of competence: monitoring of public service missions, 
granting private licenses [with the] capacity to regulate and sanction” 
(Bustamante 2008: 188). 
 
In Europe, there has been extensive public debate and discussion about the role and 
scope of PSB and what constitutes public value in communications. Of course Europe 
has a strong PSB tradition, especially the case in northern Europe (c.f. Iosifidis 2010; 
Lowe & Hujanen 2002; Blumler 1992), and this accounts for much of the public 
concern over potential threats. Originating in the reconstruction of nation states in the 
post-war period (Uricchio 2009), support for PSB in Europe has focused on its social 
and cultural purposes in contributing to national cultures and democracies (Lowe & 
Jauert 2005) – a very different approach compared with the USA where federal 
communications regulation prioritised market competition. As Hallin and Mancini 
argued (2004:49), “just as the state in Europe is expected to play an active role in … 
maintaining the health of national industries, it is expected to intervene in media 
markets to accomplish a variety of collective goals”. 
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In the 1980s, however, European audiovisual policy shifted in response to increasing 
global competition in the media and communications sector, among other things, to 
support market developments through regulatory efforts to bring about (partial) 
economic and technical harmonisation, although leaving the member states of the 
European Union considerable autonomy and competence regarding cultural policy 
(Bustamante 2008; Michalis 2007; Harcourt 2005; Majone 1998; Humphreys 1996; 
Collins 1994). It was left to national regulatory authorities to make sense of the 
sometimes contrary imperatives as they sought to co-ordinate economic policy across 
Europe to strengthen a common market by implementing directives from the EU in 
the member states to ensure market performance and consumer protection while, at 
the same time, fostering national cultural policies. 
 
Majone (1998:199) outlined the potential advantages of national regulatory agencies 
operating in a dynamic market while also facing complex social and cultural policy 
issues. They have the capacity and expertise to deal with complex technical and 
market issues that impact both firms and consumers, they offer a flexible way of 
delivering government policy in co-operation with industry and consumer 
representatives alike, they afford the opportunity for consultation and public 
engagement, and they ensure sufficient continuity for markets and consumers across 
changing governments. They also, and this being the reason why Europe requires 
their existence, provide the necessary link to European institutions and other member 
states while delivering the cultural policies of their own governments (Michalis 
2007). 
 
As Europe moves towards greater market integration, a critical question is whether 
regulation will follow the US model or whether a new style of regulation might 
emerge that combines social, cultural and economic policy objectives? This 
distinction is important if regulators are to achieve multiple aims at the same time: 
enable competition in markets and technological innovation, deal with potentially 
vulnerable consumers, and also protect and promote the broader social and cultural 
objectives traditionally associated with public service broadcasting. In scoping the 
new style of regulation, Baldwin et al. (1998) emphasised that, in both 
conceptualisation and practice, regulation encompasses many forms beyond the 
commonly-understood polarisation of top-down command-and-control versus 
deregulated markets. Some forms of regulation extend the reach of regulatory 
agencies well beyond the state, for instance by establishing quasi-independent bodies 
in co-ordination with other agencies, commercial enterprises, civil society groups and 
the public. From a broader sociological perspective, then, regulation can be 
interpreted as only one among many diverse and dispersed forms of governance 
(Jessop 2000). This wider conception of regulation proves to be vital when we turn to 
the UK context. 
 
 
Media regulation in the UK: Ofcom 
 
When empowered in 1997, the New Labour government reflected some broader 
European thinking in embracing regulation as a component of ‘third way’ policy. The 
ambition was to combine the principled and independent regulation of markets with 
consumer protection, wide stakeholder engagement and a social and cultural policy 
designed to advance the public interest (Lunt and Livingstone 2012). Although the 
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motivations for such an approach could be located within the media and 
communication sector from the 1980s, the approach was far wider. In many sectors 
there was a growing concern that the opposition between public ownership and 
neoliberal governance was failing to address important issues of either market 
regulation or social and cultural policy objectives (Just 2009). Collins and Muroni 
(1996) captured the New Labour vision as it was taken up within the media and 
communications sector through their suggestion that there should be neither 
competition without regulation (given the market failure problem for PSB) nor 
regulation without competition (given the distinctively innovative capacity of 
markets). 
 
As part of its new regulatory regime, the UK Communications Act (2003) established 
a new, convergent regulator in media and communications, the Office of 
Communications – abbreviated Ofcom (see Lunt and Livingstone 2011). Ofcom 
encompassed areas of media and communications that had previously been handled 
by different agencies for commercial television, radio, and telecommunications. As an 
institution, Ofcom could establish a unified approach to regulation across the sector 
(notwithstanding that areas such as advertising, film and the internet were excluded), 
having sufficient scope and capacity to meet the challenges of an increasingly global, 
converged media landscape. While such a unified approach was much called for, 
given the confusion caused by multiple regulators in a converging media landscape 
(e.g. Collins and Murroni 1996), one might understandably express caution about 
what is thereby lost – the ability of smaller scale, targeted regulators to be ‘fine tuned’ 
to their specific domains, even resulting in different positions on key value debates in 
media and communications policy. 
 
Notably, Ofcom’s statutory duties prioritised furthering the interests of both citizens 
and consumers, thereby combining competition and consumer protection with social 
and cultural aspects of media and communications policy in a manner that might be 
regarded as either ambitious or problematic (Livingstone et al 2007). Indeed, this 
particular combination of priorities generated concerns that Ofcom would tend to 
favour market competition at the expense of public policy and citizen-related aims, 
including the management of PSB (Harvey 2011; Just 2009). After observing its early 
days, Gibbons (2005) argued that this bias led Ofcom subtly to renegotiate its 
statutory duties by casting social and cultural issues in economic language, explaining 
them using economic metaphors. One example is Ofcom’s interpretation of the 
BBC’s importance as a PSB provider as a monopoly problem, sidelining the diversity 
of PSB content produced by the BBC (and, even, the competitive processes within the 
BBC). Iosifidis (2010) also contests Ofcom’s assumption that competition is or 
should be the norm in public service systems generally, pointing out that collaboration 
rather than competition characterises systems with more than one publicly funded 
PSB provider (e.g. Germany or pluralist examples such as the Dutch system).  
 
As things have turned out, much of Ofcom’s work has indeed been devoted to 
competition policy, structural issues in the communications market, consumer 
protection and technical issues such as digitisation and spectrum allocation. Ofcom 
also had regulatory powers over the PSB operators funded by advertising (Channel 4 
and SC4), as well as commercial broadcasters with public service commitments that 
are incumbent in their licensing agreements (ITV and Five). Ofcom was also tasked 
with promoting the digital agenda in the UK and promoting technological 
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convergence, both of which have important implications for the structure and 
functions of the public service system – and, indeed, for the British media system as a 
whole. 
 
How, then, would the focus on competition influence the way that Ofcom conducted 
its periodic and statutory reviews of PSB? Bearing in mind the importance for PSB 
that broadcasters should be self-governing, independent of both government and from 
vicissitudes of the market, an agency such as Ofcom that represents both government 
and the market could undermine the autonomy of the BBC, changing the fundamental 
grounds by which PSB is regulated. Crucially, the new regulatory regime created an 
agency that broadened the very conception of regulation. As we argue in Lunt and 
Livingstone (2012), Ofcom was conceived as an institution in the public sphere – 
governing not only through top down command-and-control processes but also, more 
subtly, through a range of discursive, public-facing, evidence-led processes. As we 
detail in what follows, Ofcom’s activities in relation to PSB review (and more 
generally) were conducted both by establishing regulatory codes and enforcement and 
also through a range of more diversified strategies of governance, including public 
and stakeholder consultation, social and market research, policy analysis and 
forecasting. In consequence, regulatory debate was highly public, strongly 
deliberative and evidence-based, allowing for visible contestation from civil society 
as well as public and private sector players.  The raises the question as to whether 
Ofcom’s operation as an institution in the public sphere changed the nature of the 
traditional struggle between market and citizen objectives in relation to PSB? We 
address that question next. 
 
 
Ofcom’s first PSB review (2004) 
 
In its first review of public service television (oddly radio was omitted from analysis) 
Ofcom provided a definition of PSB, analysed the market conditions of public service 
broadcasters, consulted widely, conducted audience research on attitudes towards 
PSB, and produced a range of recommendations (Ofcom 2005). Being ‘a creature of 
statute’, as its officials often remind critics, Ofcom started from the definition of 
purposes and characteristics of PSB in the Communications Act 2003. This contrasts 
with the traditional approach of defining PSB in terms of the activities of existing 
operators. The Act was not at all radical in its conception of PSB. It defined its 
purposes as informing, educating and entertaining audiences through stimulating, high 
quality content and services that are innovative, challenging, engaging and widely 
available, as supporting diverse cultural activities through a range of genres (e.g. 
drama, comedy, music, film and the arts), and as facilitating public understanding and 
debate through objective news and current affairs. But the effect of defining PSB in 
terms of abstract purposes rather than particular institutions immediately opened a 
conception of providers beyond the BBC, recognising the potential of the 
proliferation of digital channels that could carry recognisably public service content 
as well as the emergence of online content and services that might meet the purposes 
and characteristics of public service media. This made the idea of funding public 
service content rather than, or even instead of, public service institutions thinkable. 
That idea was hotly debated in public and policy circles during the first years of the 
21st century. 
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In a second and potentially radical step, Ofcom (2005) established an evidence-based 
approach: rather than relying, as previously, on principled arguments for the needs of 
the public, Ofcom prioritised an approach based on market and audience research in 
order to gauge public views of and support for existing PSB services, institutions, 
their funding model (a mix of licence fee and advertising revenue) and the existing 
regulatory system. Although the findings produced positive public support for PSB 
and the BBC, in particular, on all counts, this approach also raised the possibility of 
radical alternatives. Suppose, for example, that the public did not value BBC content 
or support the licence fee. What then for PSB in Britain?  
 
The possible loss of future audiences, and thereby of public support, also informed 
Ofcom’s market analysis. This pointed to significant problems already discernable on 
the horizon for the existing mixed market model. Specifically, the advent of new 
online platforms threatened the advertising revenues on which the commercial PSB 
providers depend, while digitisation transforms the spectrum market by opening the 
possibility that commercial PSB providers would be inclined to reduce their public 
service commitments as the financial benefits of licensing were potentially reduced by 
increasing channels that were not committed to producing public service content. 
Taken together, according to Ofcom these changes would undermine competition for 
the BBC. Moreover, since the market-oriented model holds that competition is a 
central driver of value and innovation, its absence would, by repositioning the BBC as 
a monopoly provider of PSB, undermine the BBC itself. 
 
Ofcom’s answer was, first, to explore alternative potential sources of revenue for 
public service broadcasters beyond the BBC (to create competition) and, second, to 
argue that generic public service broadcasters should be replaced by a system in 
which different broadcasters play different roles alongside an increasing contribution 
from specialist digital channels and online services. Although the BBC would remain 
a central component of the PSB system, ITV would focus on its strengths in news and 
drama while reducing commitments in regional and children’s programming. Channel 
4 would focus on innovation in programming and Five on UK-originated production. 
More radical still, Ofcom proposed establishing a Public Service Publisher [PSP] to 
commission public service content for digital and online platforms. Funding was to be 
contestable, meaning it would be allocated on the basis of competition between 
agencies (excluding the BBC) to compensate for the dispersal of advertising revenues 
and, importantly, to allow for a greater range of suppliers such as educational 
institutions or independent production companies to take advantage of opportunities 
offered via developments in new media. 
 
In the accompanying public debate it proved difficult for civil society to contest the 
vision proffered by Ofcom which implied (implicitly) that the BBC needed 
competitors to guard against complacency, and that audiences would eventually desert 
the BBC (even though there was little evidence of that), and, most generally, that the 
digital landscape would be transformative. In consequence, arguments were polarised 
between those looking for innovation in funding PSB beyond the BBC and supporters 
of the BBC. The concerns of those supporting the BBC being less that Ofcom’s 
analysis was wrong but rather that in financially stringent times the PSP funds would 
not be additive but would come directly from BBC coffers by ‘top slicing’ revenue 
from the licence fee. If, as a result, this reduced the capacity of the BBC to continue 
to innovate in programming and new platforms, there would be a downward spiral, 
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confining the BBC to working in predominantly linear media while digital platforms 
and new media would afford the development of a more diverse mediascape 
delivering public service content (of as yet unknown and untested quality, diversity 
and reach) from a plurality of providers. 
 
The effect of Ofcom’s first PSB review, then, was to shift the initiative away from 
PSB providers, and particularly here the BBC, towards government and the industry, 
driven by a vision of changing public taste for more popular and diverse media 
content as well as challenges posed by changing markets and technological modes of 
delivery. To be sure, the power to define PSB always rests with government, but now 
government had an agency that could conduct research and market analysis, provide 
conceptual review, facilitate public consultation, and so guide negotiations between 
government and broadcasters, while also having regulatory control over commercial 
public service content suppliers. Meanwhile, the PSB providers had to deal with a 
new, powerful arm of the state that was actively reshaping the environment within 
which they operated. At the same time, their institutional authority was challenged. 
Ofcom made a number of recommendations concerning the governance, transparency 
and accountability of the BBC, urged the incorporation of public value tests as a vital 
component of BBC self-governance, and put the competitive context for commercial 
public service suppliers firmly on the agenda. Most generally, Ofcom promoted 
longer-term initiatives that favoured the dispersal of PSB into public service content 
that was conceived independently of particular institutions.  
 
Although the BBC has been under attack from various quarters since its inception, 
and has generally proven itself more adaptable to the changing media environment 
than anticipated or welcomed by its critics, the regulatory consequences of a digital 
revolution in the making, as outlined above, certainly posed as big a challenge as the 
BBC has ever faced. In its 2004 response, Building Public Value, the BBC offered its 
own principled account of PSB values, while also accepting the need to make its 
governance more transparent and publicly accountable. Both Ofcom’s work and that 
of the BBC in response informed the review undertaken by the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport in preparation for the renewal of the BBC’s Charter, the 
legislative framework within which the BBC operates, culminating in the 2006 White 
Paper, A Public Service for All: The BBC in the Digital Age. 
 
Four important features of the new charter settlement between the government and the 
BBC were partly influenced by Ofcom’s work in the PSB review. First, the BBC was 
required to change its governance from a board that combined executive with 
accountability functions into a trust that would have oversight authority for a separate 
BBC executive that was responsible for the company’s management. Second, the 
BBC was required to be explicit about the public value delivered by its programming 
and services. Third, the BBC would be subject to market impact assessment 
conducted by Ofcom for new media content proposals, and actually of any 
innovations in programme content or delivery platform. These changes significantly 
impacted BBC operating principles. According to Freedman (2008), this introduced a 
character of managerialism that is incompatible with the values of public service, 
even if, as Collins (2007) argued, adjusting the BBC to a necessary modernisation of 
public services by using public value management to optimise the reach, impact, 
quality and value for money of its programmes and services. Fourth, and also 
significant, was the Charter’s financial settlement because this mandated an increase 
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in the licence fee to cover the costs of digital switch over. On the one hand this put the 
BBC in the vanguard of digitisation, going against the grain of Ofcom’s first review 
that forecast existing PSB providers being lesser partners in the digital age, but on the 
other it introduced a government-controlled element in the licence fee, opening the 
path to further interventions in BBC expenditure. 
 
 
Ofcom’s second PSB review (2008/9) 
 
Ofcom’s second review of public service television took place against the background 
of the new charter agreement and increased financial pressures on advertising-funded 
PSBs and content providers (Ofcom 2008). Already the commercial PSBs were 
withdrawing from their commitments in the face of increasing competition, with 
regional and children’s programming particularly under threat (see D’Arma et al 
2010). Repositioned more clearly as an advisor to government rather than an 
independent expert body driving the agenda (as in the first review), Ofcom shifted 
ground internally as well. Because consumer and citizen interests called for 
protection, its previous focus on structural constraints in media markets was giving 
way to an increased emphasis on consumer issues. Ofcom’s market analysis in the 
second review revealed that by 2008 the market share of the main PSB providers had 
fallen by 17 percent since the first review. Ofcom’s prognosis that digitisation and 
online services would result in a plurality of suppliers for public service content 
looked less certain, and the renegotiation of public service obligations by the 
commercial PSB firms added to the sense of an emerging crisis in the delivery of 
public value beyond the BBC. 
 
Interestingly, the problems experienced by commercial PSB firms in some ways 
strengthened the position of the BBC, making more obvious its key role in 
guaranteeing the delivery of public value. Moreover, far from being left behind the 
BBC was proving itself in the vanguard of innovation in digital and online services. 
Still, as Ofcom’s audience analysis in the 2008 review showed, audiences were 
increasingly taking up digital broadcasting and online services, raising the question of 
how this might affect public support for PSB. Ofcom’s interpretation of the first 
review had suggested a lag between public attitudes and changing service provisions. 
By 2008 surely the audience would be re-evaluating its attitudes towards PSB? Not 
so. Ofcom’s audience research again demonstrated that the public continued to place a 
high value on PSB, that it supported all of the PSB purposes identified by Ofcom’s 
first review, and that as a medium television remained the ‘main source’ for the 
delivery of these important values. 
 
It seems, therefore, that the public did not see online services as any substitute for 
broadcasting as a platform for delivering public service content, even though they 
were embracing such services for other purposes. Had Ofcom bought too strongly into 
the technologically determinist position that audience values and behaviour would be 
transformed by the introduction of digital and online services? In practice, it appears 
that new media are being integrated with existing media without eroding the 
distinction between existing PSB providers and new digital broadcast and online 
services. This suggests that old favourites are ‘remediated’ by audiences as they find 
new uses for them alongside the new services they are adopting (Bolter and Grusin 
1999). But Ofcom was reluctant to let go of the expectation that new media would 
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replace old media, and thus made much of the (indisputable) increasing use of new 
media by young people in particular. They argued that while general attitudes towards 
PSB remain positive, its position is diminishing in long-term market terms. But while 
shifts in audience behaviour are undeniable, the audience’s continued commitment to 
UK-originated content, news and factual broadcasting, and programmes that reflect 
diverse ways of living and thinking is certainly noteworthy. 
 
In a rather problematic piece of audience research conducted to support its case, 
Ofcom asked people to rank the five genres they consider most valuable for the 
delivery of public value. The results showed that some genres strongly associated 
with PSB were not ranked as highly as others – particularly, film, comedy, religious 
programming, arts programming and classical music. Arguably this forced ranking 
approach conflated viewing preferences with perceived value. Indeed, Ofcom’s 
tendency to treat audience responses as expressions of consumer preference rather 
than as public attitudes on wider questions that impact on the rights and lives of 
citizens serves to obscure any empirical support for less viewed but culturally 
important genres. A similar problem was evident in Ofcom’s interpretation of its 
research on contingent valuation in the second PSB review (Ofcom 2008). Here 
Ofcom had asked people to indicate how much they would be prepared to pay to 
guarantee a range of news and current affairs programmes. Finding that people are in 
fact prepared to pay for such services was taken by Ofcom to indicate public support 
for its principle of competition for quality. However these results could be better 
understood not as an expression of personal choice but as support for a media system 
that affords the expression of multiple opinions by creating the conditions necessary 
for diverse voices to be heard and for differences to be expressed. 
 
In addition to the above audience research, Ofcom conducted a wide-ranging and high 
profile consultation on future models for the structure and funding of PSB in the UK. 
The responses revealed widespread support for the idea that a new funding model 
would be required in the future and little support for either a model that marginalised 
the BBC or for a BBC-only model (although ‘top-slicing’ a portion of the licence fee 
for services beyond the BBC remained controversial). Most supported the idea of a 
gradual evolution in PSB, with a continuing central role for the BBC and 
supplemented by a sustainable future for alternative PSB providers, especially 
Channel 4. Contrary to the radical alternatives posed by the first PSB review, 
therefore, Ofcom’s commitment to evidence-based policy and public consultation led 
it in its second review towards a more gradualist approach to change, one that secured 
the BBC at its centre. Intriguingly, it is possible that had Ofcom conceived of a more 
citizen-oriented rather than consumer-led approach to its audience research, the result 
might have been more radical and actually less supportive of the status quo. This 
because when the audience is approached instrumentally, with public opinion 
measured as the aggregate of individual views rather than through a deliberative 
exploration of the collective future, a conservative outcome is surely expected. 
 
 
Regaining the initiative 
 
Ofcom’s two PSB reviews reflect the different stages of its own institutional 
development as a regulatory agency. The first review was set as a priority under the 
2003 Act and Ofcom was required to complete the process within its first year. At that 
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stage Ofcom was just ‘cutting its teeth’ as a regulatory agency and was strongly 
focussed on competition and deregulatory issues in order to realise the radical 
potential of digitisation, online media and convergence. By the second review, Ofcom 
had ‘settled down’, completed its major strategic reviews and moved from a focus on 
structural constraints and competition issues to put greater emphasis on consumer 
issues (though attention to citizen issues remained uneven). 
 
Between the two reviews, the government was actively renegotiating the terms of the 
BBC Charter, with changes in BBC governance, a new political consensus in support 
of the BBC, and continuing challenges facing commercial and advertising-funded 
PSB providers all influencing the context within which Ofcom’s second review took 
place. Undoubtedly since the start of what has been called “the public value test era of 
the BBC” (Brevini 2010a: 357) and more recently after the adoption of the Digital 
Britain White Paper (HM Government 2009), the BBC has been subject to close 
scrutiny –  particularly when seeking to develop new services. (ibid 2010: 358). For 
example, the White Paper states that, “given the current nature of the market, new 
BBC activity has a higher risk than in the past of chilling or foreclosing market 
developments” (HM Government 2009, quoted in Brevini 2010a: 358). 
 
The European context, too, remains important, with the 2009 Communication on 
State Aid to Public Service Broadcasters (see Brevini 2010a & 2010b) raising the 
barrier for PSB ventures into new and online media compared with its predecessor 
(see European Commission 2001). Nonetheless, the BBC remains a point of reference 
as a key provider of public service content in the online world, setting this company 
apart from other PSB providers in Europe (e.g. Italy’s Rai or Spain’s RTVE) that are 
developing new media services, but have been slower to embrace the diversity new 
opportunities offered by the internet, especially in relation to news (Brevini 2010a). 
 
Where next? Pressures on PSB continue as regards their funding, definitions, 
characteristics and purposes. One challenge for those who support PSB arises from 
the tendency of existing providers to jealously defend their positions (market, 
regulatory and social/cultural) in the context of dynamic changes in the broader media 
environment. Another lies in the difficulty of imagining the consequences of 
alternative models. A third lies in the shift from national viewership to, at best, 
universal availability (despite declining audience reach). Governments, civil society, 
the industry and the public will continue to want to have a say in what public service 
and value in media and communications means, how it can best be delivered and what 
its future ought to be. Arguably an independent regulatory agency with responsibility 
to further the interests of both consumers and citizens, and with an approach that 
emphasises public consultation, deliberation and debate, remains important. Yet it is 
this very model that seems presently under threat in the UK as the new coalition 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat government rethinks, and retrenches, on its ambitions 
for Ofcom (Lunt and Livingstone, 2012). Also important is the legitimacy of resisting 
attempts to restrain the involvement of PSB in technological innovation and new 
media markets.   
 
What, then, does it mean to talk about PSB taking the initiative in today’s dynamic 
and challenging environment? Recent regulatory debates have focussed largely on 
questions of governance arrangements, the shift from generic PSB providers to a 
greater range of specialist PSM providers, the introduction of accountability through 
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public value management, and increased engagement with stakeholders, including 
both powerful new regulatory bodies and the public. We contend that future 
regulatory debate must engage more thoughtfully with purposes. The focus of much 
debate and discussion has become largely instrumental today. This is inadequate to 
address the fundamental need for establishing, or re-establishing, the legitimacy of the 
approach and practice.  
 
As an example, we can point to the vital importance of complementing the current 
emphasis on (nationally or wider) shared public values with a thorough recognition of 
cultural and political diversity as a principle. This might mean asking not so much 
what is represented in PSB (or other) media contents but also what is left out, so that 
currently marginalised or excluded voices can be incorporated. Regaining the 
initiative, in short, requires finding a way not only to reassert traditional (and still 
laudable) PSB values and operating principles, as important as that certainly is, but 
also encompassing future challenges posed by rapidly diversifying, complex and 
conflicted societies. Whether the existing PSB providers can meet this challenge or 
whether new organisations are needed is an open question, and an important one that 
only time will tell. 
 
However, our study of the interplay between Ofcom, the convergent media regulator, 
the BBC and the British government illustrates what might be required more 
generally for PSB to regain the initiative in an environment characterised by 
complexity, dispersed governance and technological and market change. First, 
notwithstanding the strategic response from the BBC, the intervention by government 
and the shifting ground of regulatory practice, the underlying questions posed by 
Ofcom in its first review are unlikely to go away. The proliferation of channels, the 
diversification in producers of public service content, the advent of online services 
and the declining market share for traditional PSB channels will continue, 
exacerbating calls for radical change. PSB and its supporters will be continually 
pressed to address their proper role and functions in a changing environment. 
Successfully regaining the initiative depends in large part on how well they are able to 
respond, and how continually they are prepared to do so. We suggest that attempts to 
regain the initiative by reasserting traditional values and established institutional 
arrangements for PSB will be increasingly less convincing, even if these providers 
retain (for longer than Ofcom expected) a large measure of public and political 
support. 
 
Second, our case study illustrates how the changing nature of governance means that 
PSB can no longer focus only on their relationship with government and the public, as 
vital as such relations obviously are and will always be. Contemporary governance 
arrangements include European institutions and new regulatory agencies and 
frameworks, and the later may be quite powerful as in the UK. The complexities of 
European audiovisual policy, combining broad harmonisation policies as priorities for 
markets and technologies with subsidiarity in cultural policy and content issues, 
creates a context within which regulatory agencies become indispensible to the 
elaboration of media policy. Thus, as Jessop (2000) observed, contemporary 
governance is dispersing power away from nation states upwards to regional 
governance and downwards to subnational agencies. This also poses challenges 
insofar as traditional PSB values, purposes and characteristics are intimately bound up 
with the post-war reconstruction of national states in the European context.  
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Third, we have shown that Ofcom, as a regulatory agency, has changed the terms of 
the public debate over the role and future of PSB. As a principled, evidence-based 
regulator, it has conducted an impressive body of research, notwithstanding our 
criticisms of its methods and interpretations. This has been done along with 
consultation and analysis of markets and of the purposes and characteristics of PSB. 
This new body, therefore, has become a locus for expertise regarding the conditions 
within which PSB operates and is essential for its legitimacy. To retain their authority, 
and looking beyond the BBC to other countries, PSB providers must seek new ways 
of knowing their audiences, including a critique of the expertise produced by the 
regulator. It would also be advantageous for them to engage the public directly in a 
dialogue about the values, purposes and characteristics of PSB, and to engage fully 
with consultation processes initiated by governments and regulators. The key is not to 
resist the trends, but to be a driver of them. More subtly, they might take advantage of 
the indeterminacies and contradictions that emerge from the complex interconnections 
among stakeholders in media policy. Far from a public relations exercise, this points 
to a strategy of thoroughgoing engagement in public debate and processes of 
government. While it might be tempting to act defensively, building walls around 
PSB institutions in efforts to protect them from a hostile and demanding environment, 
our analysis suggests that continued strategic engagement is an essential element for 
regaining the initiative. 
 
Evidently too, it will be important for PSB providers to continue to innovate, pushing 
back against expectations that PS should be confined to B – as assumed by Ofcom’s 
first review. PSM will still be engaged with broadcasting, but it is as important that 
they are engaged with innovating in digitisation and new media. It is certain, 
however, that PSB can expect a difficult ride here, as illustrated by the struggle over 
the BBC iPlayer, a platform for viewing BBC programmes online after transmission. 
The potential threat this posed to the market attracted a great deal of controversy and 
scrutiny, resulting in constraints on what can be made available and for what period. 
Nevertheless, the iPlayer has succeeded, and in so doing has considerably extended 
the public service offered to audiences. Similarly, the BBC parent website, despite 
being one of the most popular websites in the UK, is attacked for using public money 
to distort the market for news and current affairs by providing free access to news and 
editorial comment. 
 
While it is essential for PSB companies to innovate and develop new services, it is 
vital to accommodate the obvious: this can only be done in a new environment 
characterised by increased regulatory pressures, and in many cases also control. The 
cost of operating in this new governance environment is that PSB must adjust to 
changing approaches to self-governance, continuing pressure to be highly accountable 
and transparent, and clearly demonstrate the delivery of public value. Thus, although, 
as our case study illustrates, PSB in the UK retains relative autonomy in funding 
arrangements and production, and remains broadly self-governing under altered 
arrangements, they are inexorably drawn into the necessary task of engaging with new 
forms of governance and regulatory control. Regaining the initiative has, therefore, 
changed the meaning of PSB from consolidating and protecting the traditional values 
and institutional position of PSB to engaging in complex interdependencies with other 
broadcasters, other content providers, regulators, governments and the public. 
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